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Abstract 
In 1995, a Swedish pilot study of Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) was launched to 
investigate its therapeutic efficacy and cost effectiveness as treatment for Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD). In the same year, a sweeping reform of psychiatric care 
commenced, dramatically reducing the number of beds by the end of the decade. The 
psychiatry reform was presented as an important factor prompting the need for a community-
based treatment for Borderline patients. This article suggests that the introduction of DBT in 
Sweden, and its relationship to the reform, can only be adequately explained with reference to 
the wider political shift occurring at the time, whereby the Swedish welfare state and its guiding 
ethos of egalitarianism were abandoned in favour of a neoliberal ‘choice revolution’. With the 
new liberalism, hard work and individual responsibility replaced the idea of a Swedish 
‘people’s home’, a nation-wide community and social support network. This language was 
reflected in DBT, which sought to teach patients the ‘skills’ necessary ‘to create a life worth 
living’. In this context, therapy was constituted as a form of 'work' that the patient had to 
undertake to improve. Moreover, DBT rejected the prevailing view of Borderline patients as 
‘manipulative’ and ‘aggressive’, suggesting instead that they were ‘helpless’, ‘weak’ and 
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unable to regulate their emotions. This new Borderline persona fit neatly into the new liberal 
discourse: she could be taught to become a rational and independent person able to cope in a 
society that valued individual responsibility over social support. 
 
Keywords 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Dialectical Behaviour Therapy, neoliberalism, psychiatry, 
social democracy   
 
Corresponding author: 
Åsa Jansson, Institute for Medical Humanities, Durham University, Department of Geography, 
South Rd, Durham DH1 3LE 
 
Email: asa.k.jansson@durham.ac.uk 
 
 
Introduction                                 
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) was developed by US psychologist Marsha Linehan in 
the 1980s to treat a specific patient group: young women diagnosed with Borderline Personality 
Disorder (BPD) who exhibited strong suicidal or self-harming tendencies. DBT grew out of 
the more popular Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and shares many of its premises. In 
particular, within DBT emotion is perceived as automated and involuntary, but nevertheless an 
event, or process, that can be regulated. DBT relies upon a model of emotional distress that 
prejudices the internal and the individual over the social. While distress is perceived to result 
from a combination of environmental triggers and an individual’s particular vulnerability, the 
focus is solely on teaching the patient strategies to function effectively in the triggering 
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environment. This idea of an individual as a self-regulating unit resonates with the wider socio-
economic context in which this model prevails. Economic (neo)liberalism, the political 
programme of choice in the West since the 1980s, promotes neo-Victorian values such as self-
help and individual responsibility as the route to wellbeing, and can be contrasted with the 
collective social programmes of the post-war period.  
This article maps the history of DBT in Sweden from its introduction in 1995 up until 
the publication of the initial findings of the first major domestic DBT studies. In doing so, it 
addresses a small but important chapter of post-war psychiatry in Scandinavia, which 
commenced with a sweeping reform of Swedish psychiatric care in 1995. Drawing on existing 
historical accounts of political and economic reform in Sweden, as well as key policy 
documents of the time period considered, the article places the introduction of DBT in the 
context of the profound political shift taking place in Sweden at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. It begins by sketching out this shift and the events preceding it, and then goes on to 
situate the first DBT study against the backdrop of previous research on Borderline Personality 
Disorder in Swedish psychiatry, highlighting an increased focus on female patients with the 
advent of DBT. The introduction of DBT is then charted through the publications arising from 
the first domestic study and its theoretical framework, which includes Linehan’s original work 
and its translation and adaptation by Swedish clinicians. Finally, the implications of the 
changing ontology of the Borderline diagnosis within DBT is considered in relation to the 
wider shift in economic policy and political discourse that facilitated the psychiatry reform. 
This shift was ideologically framed as a necessary liberal reform of an overly bureaucratic 
system responsible for economic stagnation and the stifling of personal growth. In this context, 
DBT was presented as a way to teach Borderline patients the skills necessary to function as 
independent individuals responsible for their own wellbeing. Patients perceived their 
participation in therapy as a form of ‘work’ requiring diligence and commitment, prompting 
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questions about the role and meaning of work as therapy/therapy as work in twenty-first-
century neoliberal society. 
The year 1995 was a watershed year in Swedish psychiatric care. Across the country, 
local counties began the closure of psychiatric hospitals in a sweeping reform that saw the 
number of beds dramatically reduced by the end of the decade. The same year as the psychiatry 
reform began, the first Swedish study of DBT was commissioned. Known as the SKIP study, 
its chief aims were to ‘investigate the prevalence of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
among women who make repeated suicide attempts’ (Karolinska Institutet, 1999: 21), and to 
compare DBT to other forms of treatment for Borderline patients. Key investigators in the early 
Swedish research on the efficacy of DBT included psychiatrists Marie Åsberg and Åsa 
Nilsonne, as well as Anna Kåver, a clinical psychologist. Following Linehan’s model of DBT 
(Linehan, 1993), the SKIP study focussed on female Borderline patients with strong suicidal 
tendencies, an approach that was reiterated and theorised in Kåver and Nilsonne’s clinical 
manual on DBT published in 2002.  
The 1995 psychiatry reform significantly reduced the number of hospital beds, seeking 
instead to integrate the severely mentally ill into the community. The SKIP study explicitly 
framed DBT as a cost-effective treatment for a category of patients who required significant 
institutional support, teaching them the skills needed to survive in the post-institutional world. 
Much of the language of DBT corresponded to the increasingly popular policy language of the 
period: emphasising ‘responsibility’, ‘independence’, and ‘work’. Moreover, within the SKIP 
study, the typical Borderline patient was constituted as a ‘helpless’, almost childlike woman 
unable to control her own strong emotions or to cope with life. DBT was framed as a strategy 
to teach this Borderline patient the skills she needed in order to function in a society that 
increasingly valued autonomy and independence. Initial assessments of patients’ experiences 
of DBT reveal a perception of therapy as a form of ‘work’ that the patient had to undertake in 
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order to get better. Work as therapy has been central to modern psychiatry since the early 
nineteenth century, where it went hand in hand with a worldview that promoted industriousness 
as a virtue, and played a key role as a restorative and corrective practice in asylum treatment 
(see e.g. Freebody, 2016; Scull, 1993). In the therapeutic context of DBT in Sweden at the turn 
of the millennium, therapy itself took on the role of restorative labour. Following from this, it 
is argued here that the therapeutic structure of DBT, the ways in which it was deployed in 
Sweden, and the language used to talk about its effects, cannot be separated from a wider socio-
economic context that increasingly promoted work over welfare and individual responsibility 
over social support.  
A rich history exists charting the development of psychotherapies in Britain and the 
US, as well as the early history of psychiatric treatment in Western Europe (see for instance 
Burnham, 2012; Caplan, 1998; Engstrom, 2003; Marks, 2012). More recently, an emerging 
body of work addresses the history of psychiatric care and treatment in the former communist 
states (Marks and Savelli, 2016) and the history of psychotherapy in Western and Central 
Europe (Chaney, 2017; Cummings, 2017; Freis, 2017). However, the history of psychiatry and 
psychotherapy in the Scandinavian countries remains underexplored, and existing works have 
largely taken a descriptive approach (e.g. Gieser, 2009). While diagnostic tools and treatment 
approaches used in Scandinavian psychiatry and psychology have for the most part been 
borrowed from the Anglo-American context, post-war socio-economic development in these 
countries was markedly different from both Britain and the US. The health systems emerging 
in Scandinavia in the second half of the twentieth century shared many features with, for 
instance, the British National Health Service but were, in other ways, unique. Local variations 
in policy language and attitudes to health and illness meant that diagnostic language and 
treatment approaches were not simply transferred wholesale; thus, the transfer of knowledge 
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can only be understood with reference to the wider cultures into which such knowledge was 
translated and used. 
In a recent special issue of this journal, Sarah Marks importantly notes that historians 
‘have, to a large degree, not attended to the intellectual and cultural development of many 
therapeutic approaches’, which ‘has the potential consequence of implying that therapies have 
emerged as value-free techniques, outside of a social, economic and political context’ (Marks, 
2017: 4). Here I follow Marks in arguing for the importance of explaining therapeutic 
developments with reference to the societies that produced them. Moreover, I suggest that such 
an approach to the history of psychotherapy and the psy disciplines more generally is – or 
should be – a political act. In the present article, I aim to show that the history of DBT in 
Sweden is not simply a history of psychiatric treatment, it is a history of the relationship 
between psychiatric knowledge and political economy. At any particular moment in time, 
prevailing models of mental illness and its treatment do not merely reflect, but are produced by 
and reinforce the existing socio-economic order. While I do not wish to suggest a grand 
narrative of ‘social control’, I implore historians of psychiatry to recall Foucault’s observations 
about the pervasive role of psychiatric power in modern society (see e.g. Foucault, 2006: 189-
90) and his insistence that we analyse and critique the role played by apparently benevolent 
institutions such as psychiatry in the reproduction of hierarchical societies.  
 
From egalitarian bureaucracy to ‘choice revolution’: The rise and decline of 
the Swedish welfare state  
At the end of World War II, when much of Europe was faced with the momentous task of 
rebuilding infrastructure and creating new social structures, the construction of the Swedish 
welfare state was already underway. Because of the country’s official position of neutrality 
during the world wars, from the 1870s economic growth continued largely uninterrupted for a 
7 
 
century (Henrekson, Jonung and Stymne, 1996). The Social Democratic Worker’s Party 
(Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet) governed Sweden without interruption from 1932 until 
1976. During this time, the party attempted to build the Swedish folkhem (‘people’s home’), a 
society founded on Keynesian economics and social egalitarianism. While such ideas were 
equally popular in many other West-European states, two things are worth noting about the 
Swedish context. First of all, state ownership of public goods and regulation of the market went 
further than in most democratic countries in the West. In addition to schools, hospitals, public 
transport, telecommunication, and energy, the Swedish state also held monopoly on 
pharmaceutical trading and alcohol sales. Moreover, in stark contrast to many other West-
European states, private alternatives to state-provided services were virtually non-existent in 
both the education and health care sectors. By the 1970s the private health care industry had 
been significantly marginalised following a 1969 law that made all medical practitioners 
employees of the state and placed strict limitations on their ability to run private practices on 
the side (Borgenhammar, 1984: 472).  
Secondly, it was not primarily the level of public spending and ownership that 
distinguished Sweden from other European democracies with similar systems, ‘but rather the 
way in which it [….] institutionalized the values of universalism and social egalitarianism’ 
(Blomqvist, 2004: 140). There was an explicit aim on the part of the Social Democratic 
government to create a classless society, not just in an economic sense of the word, but also in 
the sense of social equality and shared values. In large part this was a top-down, state-driven 
project, reducing income inequality through heavy taxation of the wealthy and creating a social 
security system that ensured a comparatively comfortable standard of living for all citizens 
(Björklund and Freeman, 1997: 33-6). Gender inequality was tackled primarily through a 
heavily subsidised child care and preschool system and a universal and comparatively generous 
allowance for parental leave, which both parents were encouraged to share. The overall aim of 
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the Social Democratic project of building the Swedish welfare state was to create a society 
where not only the most visible socio-economic inequalities were erased, but where every 
person could, in effect, feel like one of the people in the ‘people’s home’. 
Until the mid-1970s, the welfare state had the support of a significant majority of the 
population on both sides of the political divide. Swedish citizens did not feel the effects of the 
1973 oil crisis and subsequent economic downturn quite as strongly as, for instance, citizens 
in the Anglo-American countries. This was, however, in part thanks to continued high public 
spending, which soon generated a substantial deficit. Right-of-centre opposition to the 
government’s fiscal policies increasingly gained ground, and in the 1976 general election the 
Social Democrats were unseated by a centre-right coalition. When the former returned to power 
in 1982, their previously unequivocal commitment to public ownership had grown ambivalent. 
Soon after the 1982 general election, the new Social Democratic government began a process 
of deregulation and privatization. Deregulation of the mortgage market removed the previously 
quite strict limits on household borrowing and produced a housing bubble that eventually led 
to the country’s worst economic downturn since the early 1930s. In 1991, at the height of the 
recession, a new right-of-centre coalition came to power. The conservative-led government 
lasted only three years, but by this point faith in the Keynesian model had declined on both 
sides of the political divide, in favour of deregulation of the market and privatization of public 
goods (Blomqvist, 2004: 144-6; Lindbom, 2001: 171-2; Sejersted, 2011: 333-7, 388-92; 
Svanborg-Sjövall, 2014: 182-3). 
As a result, the health care industry was gradually opened up to private actors in a 
reform modelled on the British system.1 It is important to note that this was not just a shift in 
policy, but also in the general attitude to public goods. The previous idea (or ideal) of a 
universal health care system that aimed to eradicate health inequality by ensuring that service 
quality was equally high across the country, was replaced by what became known as a ‘choice 
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revolution’,2 driven by the contrary belief that equality and access to high quality care could 
only be guaranteed by a system that allowed each citizen to freely choose their preferred health 
care provider from a wide range of public and private service providers.  
From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s a notable shift in attitudes occurred, in the first 
instance among the political establishment, but eventually also across wide sections of the 
public – what one observer has aptly termed a ‘paradigmatic drift’ (Carson, 2005: 193). The 
Social Democratic ethos was gradually abandoned, and with it the language of egalitarianism, 
solidarity, and social cohesion that had underpinned and reinforced the folkhem concept. This 
was replaced by liberal language centred around choice and freedom, coupled with a stronger 
focus on individual responsibility for one’s socio-economic situation.  
The move toward neoliberal economics in Sweden occurred against the backdrop of a 
wider shift in the West beginning in the 1970s. Neoliberalism is, however, used here to refer 
not only to an economic idea centred upon privatization, deregulation, and, more broadly, free 
market capitalism. Following Nikolas Rose, we can understand it as an ideology (here meaning 
a set of ideas about how a society should be organised) in which ‘the well-being of both 
political and social existence is to be ensured…through the “enterprising” activities and choices 
of autonomous entities – businesses, organizations, persons – each striving to maximize its own 
advantage’ (Rose, 1999: 153). The fiscal approach championed by Reagan in the US and 
Thatcher in the UK was closely wedded to a belief in individualism and human freedom. 
Indeed, Austrian economist F.A. Hayek, on whose work Thatcher based much of her approach, 
had originally argued for economic liberalism as the only way to defend political freedom 
against the threat of totalitarianism (Hayek, 2001[1944]). However, while a new politics of 
privatization, deregulation, and austerity introduced in Sweden in the 1980s and 90s largely 
mirrored that of the Anglo-American context, there was a notable difference in the language 
used to sell neoliberalism to the public. Merging the language of liberalism with the language 
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of the traditional left, the new economic policy was marketed as a ‘choice revolution’ by the 
right-of-centre coalition that governed between 1991 and 1993.  
Central to the new economic policy was a focus on ‘work’ as an end in itself. In terms 
of welfare policy, this sentiment generated increasing support for what became known as 
arbetslinjen (‘the work line’), a policy which was eventually endorsed by political parties on 
either side of the centre. According to this view, work is an end in itself, as well as the antidote 
to most of society’s challenges, such as segregation and youth crime, but also mental illness 
(Piippola, 2010: 258). This approach came to gradually influence the public medical insurance 
system, where illness was increasingly defined in terms of (in)ability to work rather than 
according to medical criteria. This had particular impact on perceptions of mental illness, where 
the individual’s ability to carry out some form of employment became central in terms of 
defining and treating pathological states (see e.g. Söderberg, 2009: 498-9 for an outline of the 
new medical insurance system). This view of work as a moral good and a measure of a person’s 
usefulness in society has roots going back to the nineteenth century, where work was deployed 
as a corrective strategy in prisons and as a therapeutic practice in lunatic asylums, as well as a 
way to ensure that the poor were being useful to society through the introduction of workhouses 
(Ernst, 2016).3 As we will see below, the introduction of DBT in Sweden added a new 
dimension to the idea of work as restorative, where rather than work being used as a form of 
therapy, therapy itself was constituted as work.  
 
The 1995 psychiatry reform 
Against the backdrop of the shift described above, on the first of January 1995 a law came into 
force that produced a sweeping reform of psychiatric care. The anti-psychiatry movement that 
had emerged in the UK in the 1960s was influential also in Sweden, but had not lead to any 
significant changes in the care and treatment of psychiatric patients. While there was a modest 
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and gradual reduction in inpatient places over the next two decades, sweeping 
deinstitutionalisation only occurred following the 1995 reform (Arvidsson and Eriksson, 2005: 
186-7; Stefansson and Hansson, 2001: 82). The closing of psychiatric hospitals in Sweden was, 
importantly, not primarily motivated by a critique of institutionalisation of the mentally ill, but 
rather a product of the neoliberal ‘choice revolution’, driven in part by a belief that psychiatric 
patients should learn to live independently and be integrated into the community, and in part 
by concerns to make psychiatric treatment more cost effective during a time of recession.4 
In 1992, a parliamentary commission was tasked with investigating access to services 
by the long-term, severely mentally ill, and its findings formed the basis for the subsequent 
1995 reform (Arvidsson and Ericson, 2005: 187; Brinck, 1994: 265; Stefansson and Hansson, 
2001: 83).5 The commission concluded, among other things, that greater measures should be 
taken to rehabilitate the mentally ill and reintegrating them into society and the job market. 
Following from this, the Social Insurance Agency (Försäkringskassan) and local 
municipalities were given greater responsibilities than previously in terms of preparing 
mentally ill patients for a return to work, through various job-training and social rehabilitation 
programmes (Brinck, 1994: 265-6; Stefansson and Hansson, 2001: 82-4). Once begun in 
earnest, deinstitutionalisation was rapid and sweeping. The number of days of psychiatric 
hospital care were reduced by 75% by the end of the decade, reflecting the downsizing or 
closing of a number of inpatient institutions. In the late 1960s, there had been approximately 
33 000 psychiatric beds in Sweden, servicing a population of seven and a half million. At the 
start of the twenty-first century there were around 5000 beds left, in a population of just under 
9 million (Arvidsson and Ericson, 2005: 186-7; Brinck, 1994: 258-61). 
The advent of Dialectical Behaviour Therapy in Sweden can only be adequately 
understood within this context. DBT was explicitly framed as a response to the need for a cost-
effective outpatient treatment for a group of patients who required long-term psychiatric care 
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and support. As we will see below, DBT placed individual responsibility in focus; the patient 
was to learn the skills needed to function independently in society. This emphasis on learned 
autonomy and independence was, I argue, both moral and economic, informed by a neoliberal 
approach to social economics (and, to some extent, by a neo-Victorian view of humanity). 
However, the harsh political climate present in Britain and the US during the Thatcher-Reagan 
era was, at the time, largely absent from the Swedish context (for a poignant critique of mental 
health policy in the hands of Anglo-American neoconservatists, see Scull, 1989). It is important 
to note that when neoliberal ideas were introduced to the wider Swedish public in the lead-up 
to the 1991 election, reform (of the welfare state in general as well as of psychiatry) was framed 
almost exclusively as a positive strategy aimed at improved quality and more flexible services. 
The keywords were choice and independence: freedom to choose one’s school, doctor, and 
energy supplier (and so on), and independence from a controlling and bureaucratic state 
apparatus that sought to dictate to people how to live their lives. In a 1990 policy document 
entitled Ideas for Our Future, the largest right-of-centre party, Moderaterna (the Moderates) 
asserted that ‘every intervention in citizens’ lives, every regulation, every tax, makes planning 
more difficult and kills life projects. We need more freedom. Much more’ (Moderata 
samlingspartiet, 1990: 65). This sentiment was reiterated in their 1994 election manifesto, 
which held that ‘power over one’s situation and everyday life should belong to individual 
human beings, not authorities’ (Moderata samlingspartiet, 1994: 8).  
Similar language of autonomy versus dependence would frame the introduction of DBT 
into the Swedish mental health system. DBT was formally introduced in Sweden the same year 
as the psychiatry reform commenced, as part of an attempt to find an effective treatment for 
people (or women, rather, as will be clear momentarily) diagnosed with Borderline Personality 
Disorder, and who exhibited ‘suicidal’ or ‘self-harming’ behaviour. These patients were seen 
as unable to cope with regular life, demanding a level of stability and permanence from the 
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structures and people around them that could, I argue, not be provided in the post-institutional, 
post-social-democratic world of infinite choice and individual freedom. DBT aimed to teach 
these patients the skills necessary to exist in this brave new world.  
 
Borderline Personality Disorder, suicidality, and the creation of DBT 
In the decade leading up to the 1995 Swedish psychiatry reform, the number of psychiatric 
inpatients diagnosed with personality disorders grew by thirty per cent (Brinck, 1994: 261). 
This development can perhaps in part be attributed to the publication of the third edition of the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III) in 1980, 
which gave personality disorders a much more prominent place than in previous editions, and 
introduced Borderline Personality Disorder as a formal diagnosis for the first time. The DSM-
III framework for personality disorders was taken up into clinical practice and research in 
Sweden, and the usefulness of the APA’s criteria for diagnosing BPD was assessed in a number 
of domestic studies in the 1980s and 90s (e.g. Kullgren, 1984; Ståhlenheim and Von Knorring, 
1996).  
Borderline first emerged as a psychiatric concept within post-war North-American 
psychoanalysis, to describe a category of patient who were perceived to oscillate between 
neurosis and psychosis, and who were not susceptible to analysis (see e.g. Knight, 1953). The 
Borderline diagnosis was not explicitly gendered in the early decades, nor were suicidality and 
self-harm distinct features, but this changed gradually in the lead-up to DSM-III.6 During this 
period, a number of different diagnostic models and criteria for Borderline were offered (see 
esp. Kernberg, 1967; Grinker, Werble and Drye, 1968; Gunderson and Singer, 1975). The 
language used to talk about Borderline patients changed, with adjectives such as ‘narcissistic’, 
‘aggressive’, and ‘manipulative’ gaining popularity, in large part thanks to the influence of 
Otto Kernberg’s (1967, 1971 and 1975) work. This was subtly reflected in the DSM criteria 
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introduced in 1980, where impulsive and self-destructive behaviours were the key symptoms 
around which the diagnosis was constituted.7  
The DSM criteria can be broadly summarised as made up of three key factors: 
dysregulated emotionality, self-destructive behaviours, and stereotypically female personality 
traits. This definition of BPD has not changed significantly since 1980. Borderline is presently 
defined as a ‘pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and 
affects, and marked impulsivity’. Key criteria include ‘chronic feelings of emptiness’, ‘suicidal 
behaviour, gestures, or threats’, ‘frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment’, 
‘affective instability’, and ‘impulsivity’ in areas such as ‘sex’, ‘spending’, and ‘binge eating’. 
Between 70 and 80% of those who are diagnosed with BPD are women (APA, 2013; Lieb et 
al., 2004), and the diagnosis has received criticism and scrutiny for its overt gender bias. Nehls 
(1998) has argued that female Borderline patients are stigmatised by clinical staff, who often 
perceive them as manipulative attention seekers. Skodol and Bender (2003) have interrogated 
the overrepresentation of women among those who receive the diagnosis, concluding that it is 
largely the result of ‘sampling bias’, and that the actual gender rate is unknown. As we will see 
below, this ties in with early BPD studies in Sweden prior to the advent of DBT, where the 
male-female ratio varied significantly between studies.  
While historians have begun to trace the history of Borderline and of personality 
disorders more generally, the clinical and theoretical processes that produced BPD as a 
typically female diagnosis have received scant attention. Becker (1997) has placed borderline 
on an historical trajectory following medieval ‘witches’ and nineteenth-century ‘hysteria’; 
however, BPD is a modern diagnosis and must be explained with reference to the psychiatric 
culture that produced and moulded it over the last 60 years. More recently, Lunbeck (2006: 
153) has offered the beginnings of an archaeology of the borderline concept, aptly suggesting 
that its emergence is best understood as ‘the fitful coalesence of a new category – assembled 
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from new concepts and new terms – that has enabled clinicians to take note of and diagnose 
dimensions of personhood they had not formerly been able or inclined to register’.  
Early post-1980 studies of BPD (the majority of which occurred in the US) tended to 
emphasise the perceived ‘attention-seeking’ and ‘aggressive’ quality of patients’ self-
destructive behaviour, meaning that patients’ self-injurious acts were primarily read as 
‘manipulative’ rather than genuinely suicidal (e.g. Koeningsberg, 1982; Zanarini et al., 1990).8 
The overrepresentation of women and the apparently high rates of suicidal behaviour among 
BPD patients attracted the attention of US psychologist Marsha Linehan, who started 
researching gender and suicidality in the 1970s (Linehan, 1971, 1973).9 Linehan (1993: 42) 
went on to develop a ‘biosocial’ model for BPD, which held that the disorder is ‘primarily a 
dysfunction of the emotion regulation system’. She suggested that individuals suffering from 
this condition have a genetic vulnerability making them more sensitive to emotional pain and 
distress, less able to tolerate negative emotions, and more dependent on social connections and 
support for their wellbeing. This genetic vulnerability would act in conjunction with 
environmental factors. For instance, Linehan noted that people diagnosed with BPD had a high 
prevalence of having experienced sexual abuse in childhood (see also e.g. Shaw and Proctor, 
2005). In her view, then, the two factors, genetics and environment, together produced the 
disorder.10  
Linehan rejected the view that Borderline patients were manipulative, selfish, and 
attention seeking, suggesting instead that they were experiencing intolerable pain, and that this 
pain was the source of their impulsive and self-destructive behaviour. Moreover, in line with 
her argument about environmental factors, Linehan offered a ‘feminist’ perspective on the 
aetiology of BPD, suggesting that that the diagnosis must be placed in the context of a society 
that values individual autonomy over a ‘social self’. She suggested that ‘the importance of a 
relational or social self among women has been highlighted by many feminist writers’, and 
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that, following from this, ‘the problems encountered by the borderline individual may result in 
part from the collision of a relational self with a society that recognizes and rewards only the 
individuated self’ (Linehan, 1993: 31-2).11 Linehan developed DBT to teach strategies for 
dealing with the pain arising from this collision between the borderline patient and their 
environment, and with the suicidal behaviour which she saw as resulting from it. In this way, 
Linehan also sought to overturn the stigma attached to the diagnosis and challenge the negative 
perception of Borderline patients (ibid.: 42-65).  
DBT shares a foundation with Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (from which it derives), 
but its primary focus is not on breaking or interrupting disordered thought patterns and 
associated actions, but rather on learning to tolerate pain and regulate strong emotions. As such 
it can be viewed as a more comprehensive programme than CBT: rather than teaching patients 
strategies to deal with a certain phobia, or with panic attacks, obsessive-compulsive behaviours, 
or generalised anxiety, the aim is, in a more basic sense, to teach patients how to live. DBT is 
constituted around two core principles: acceptance and change. It is between these two that a 
dialectic is seen to occur. The patient has to learn to accept the present situation, however 
difficult or intolerable, while at the same time working toward changing it. The synthesis, then, 
becomes ‘a life worth living’ (Dimeff and Linehan, 2001: 2; Robins, Ivanoff and Linehan, 
2001: 448).  
 The core aim of DBT is to teach patients ‘emotion regulation skills’. Emotion regulation 
has become a key concept in twenty-first-century psychiatric treatment of affective and 
personality disorders. Linehan, Bohus and Lynch (2007: 583) describe emotion dysregulation 
as ‘the inability, even when one’s best efforts are applied, to change or regulate emotional cues, 
experiences, actions, verbal responses, and/or non-verbal expressions under normative 
conditions’. The idea that suicidality and self-harm occurs as a response to dysregulated affect 
can be traced back to institutional studies on self-harming female patients in the US in the 
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1960s and 70s (Millard, 2013). However, the idea of self-regulation of emotion as a desirable 
skill has an even longer history.  Victorian physicians, keen to explain elusive mental functions 
in the language of modern science, cast emotion as an involuntary physiological process, 
suggesting that the individual had little control over its eruption. This model did not, however, 
sit comfortably with Victorian moral principles of self-help and respectability, thus, volition 
and control were restored through the concept of habit, which suggested that with persistent 
practice and ‘watchfulness’, individuals could learn to counter their natural impulses and 
manage their emotional life (see e.g. Maudsley, 1884: 93). While the late twentieth- and early 
twenty-first-century science of emotion regulation is markedly different from its Victorian 
precursor, the moral connotations have persisted and become amplified in the context of 
individualism and economic liberalism. As we will see below, the ideal of emotional self-
regulation as a valuable life skill fits neatly within the framework of neoliberal discourse on 
individual choice and responsibility. 
Linehan’s textbook on DBT, first published in 1993, introduced the practice to a wider 
clinical audience, where it gained approval as a treatment for the notoriously ‘difficult’ 
Borderline patient. Since then, DBT has been implemented as a targeted treatment for BPD in 
a number of countries and multiple studies have been carried out. The vast majority of these 
hail DBT as a great success in treating Borderline patients. This has also been the case in 
Sweden. However, the trial, assessment, and measured outcome of DBT as a treatment for 
female Borderline patients cannot be considered independently from the socio-political context 
in which it occurred, a context that helped define both the problem to be addressed (the 
psychopathology of BPD) and what constituted a ‘successful’ outcome. The pathology to be 
treated: weakness, helplessness and lack of agency and control, and the desired result: an 
independent woman able to function in the post-welfare society without a strong support 
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structure and thus being less of a financial burden on the system, were both intimately tied up 
with the new liberal project, as we will see below. 
 
Borderline in Sweden before DBT 
By the early 1990s, psychotherapy had become an important component of psychiatric care 
and treatment in Sweden. A government regulated training programme in psychotherapy was 
instituted in the 1970s, and from 1986 onward all psychiatric staff were required to have 
undergone psychotherapy training. Cognitive therapy was first introduced in Uppsala in the 
early 1980s, but the national spread of CBT was slow and gradual prior to the 2000s (Gieser, 
2009). Swedish uptake of the new DSM-III diagnoses, was, however, much more rapid. During 
the 1980s and 90s, Umeå psychiatrist Gunnar Kullgren headed a number of studies on the new 
Borderline diagnosis and suicidal behaviour as well as completed suicides (Kullgren, 1984; 
Kullgren, et al. 1986; Kullgren, 1988). One such study found the male/female ratio of BPD in 
their group of subjects to be 3:6 (Kullgren, 1984). However, in a different study Runeson and 
Beskow found the BPD diagnosis to be more common in their male subjects (Runeson and 
Beskow, 1991). Runeson wrote extensively on suicide and suicidality in young people during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, and found that repeated suicide attempts occurred among both 
male and female psychiatric patients, and that the Borderline diagnosis corresponded to 
approximately 30% of the cases he reviewed, which were of both genders (Runeson, 1989, 
1990; Runeson and Beskow, 1991; Rich and Runeson, 1992; Runeson, Beskow and Waern, 
1996). In a study published in 1993, Bodlund, Ekselius and Lindström found that gender 
differences in the Borderline diagnosis were ‘much smaller than is usually reported’ (p. 432) 
and a 1996 study investigating psychopathy and criminal acts found that in a group of 61 male 
subjects, 17 fit the diagnostic criteria for BPD (Ståhlenheim and von Knorring, 1996). 
19 
 
These early studies are significant as they recruited both male and female subjects, and found 
that significant numbers of both genders exhibited suicidal behaviour as well as fit the 
Borderline diagnosis. What is most striking about Bodlund, Ekselius and Lindström’s study 
is its conclusion regarding the gendered nature of the BPD diagnosis. When discerning 
Borderline symptoms using a self-screening tool, there was significantly less difference in the 
male-female ratio than when the same patients’ records were reviewed by clinicians. This led 
the authors to conclude that the gender bias in BPD was ‘not exclusively linked to the criteria 
per se, but also reflects a diagnostic bias on the part of the diagnostician’ (p. 432). The 
introduction of DBT in Sweden ensured a greater focus on women as the main sufferers of 
BPD. Within the context of DBT, the Borderline persona was transformed from a 
‘manipulative’ and ‘aggressive’ person of either gender, to a ‘weak’ and ‘helpless’ woman 
unable to cope in a post-institutional society that favoured independence, freedom and choice. 
 
‘Powerless, small, and helpless’: The 1995 SKIP study and the new 
Borderline patient 
In 1995, the same year as the psychiatry reform commenced, a study was commissioned by 
Stockholm’s Primary Care Trust in conjunction with the Department of Clinical Neuroscience 
at Karolinska Institute (KI). The study, which became known by its acronym SKIP (Stockholm 
County Council and Karolinska Institute Psychotherapy Project for Suicidal Women with BPD) 
aimed at investigating the prevalence of BPD among self-harming female psychiatric patients 
and compare the efficacy of three types of treatment for suicidal ideation and behaviour: DBT, 
Kernbergs’s psychodynamic psychotherapy, and standard psychiatric treatment. It should be 
noted that while Kernberg’s targeted treatment method for BPD was part of the study, his 
clinical description of the diagnosis, which included anger as a key feature, was not. The SKIP 
study was carried out in two regions: Stockholm and Uppsala, and sought to evaluate both 
20 
 
patients’ and practitioners’ experience of DBT, as well as its cost-effectiveness. The principal 
investigator was Marie Åsberg, who had previously worked on suicidality and depression. 
Åsberg founded a Swedish DBT research group, which came to include Åsa Nilsonne, a 
psychiatrist linked to the Department of Neuroscience at KI, and Anna Kåver, a psychologist 
trained in CBT (Jimson and Lindahl, 2013: 7). While the final results of the SKIP study are at 
the time of writing yet to be published, it generated a number of research articles, and opened 
the door to other DBT studies in Sweden, including a study in Uppsala overseen by Kåver.  
Kåver and Nilsonne both received their DBT training from Marsha Linehan, and the 
pair co-authored the first Swedish language DBT manual, published in 2002. Both the SKIP 
study and Kåver and Nilsonne’s subsequent manual were largely faithful to Linehan’s model 
for DBT as well as her ontological description of Borderline. However, where Linehan had 
offered a nuanced and detailed discussion of the gendered features of the Borderline persona 
as a social construct drawing on key feminist literature, these arguments were simplified in 
Kåver and Nilsonne’s condensed translation, which did not cite any sources for the argument 
that women are more reliant on social networks for their mental wellbeing than men, nor made 
any reference to feminist theory. Readers of the manual are presented with a one-dimensional 
view of gender and of feminism, one that fails to address the social production of typically 
‘female’ traits, suggesting only that these may be at odds with a society that values autonomy. 
The implication is that ‘woman’ is a fairly stable category, but that ‘female’ characteristics are 
more or less accepted in different cultures (Kåver and Nilsonne, 2002: 61-2).  
The SKIP study recruited only female participants. This was not coincidental but rather 
part of the stated remit of the study (Persius, 2006: 33). The decision to recruit exclusively 
female subjects set SKIP clearly apart from earlier studies on BPD in Sweden, where 
recruitment was not done on the basis of gender, and where consequently both male and female 
subjects participated. SKIP framed DBT as a strategy seeking to redress patients’ difficulties 
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by on the one hand validating their suffering and recognising their helplessness, while at the 
same time demanding that patients work toward changing their behaviour and taking 
responsibility for their own lives. Following Linehan’s manual for DBT, patients participating 
in the SKIP trial had to sign a contract committing to twelve months of therapy, which consisted 
in one-on-one therapy as well as group-based ‘skills training’. They were also given the 
opportunity of utilising phone consultations with their therapist when required. The contract 
between the patient and the therapist in DBT is perceived as an integral part of the therapeutic 
relationship and process, and is one of the ways in which patients are taught to be responsible 
for their own lives. Patients who sign a DBT contract have to commit to attending all sessions 
within reason (if four consecutive sessions are missed, patients are ‘out of the program’ without 
exception); agree to work toward reducing self-harm and suicidal behaviour; and agree to 
reduce therapy-disrupting behaviour. Continued therapy after the contract expires is made 
contingent upon the patient making progress during the initial contracted term (Linehan, 1993: 
112-15). 
The first results of the Lund study were published in 2003, in the form of a qualitative 
evaluation of participating patients’ and practitioners’ perceptions of DBT. The authors 
introduced the study by suggesting that ‘[t]o a very great extent it is younger women who are 
suffering from’ BPD (Persius et al., 2003: 218). In the same paragraph an earlier Swedish study 
on BPD and suicidal behaviour (Runeson and Beskow, 1991) was cited as evidence that 
suicidality is common in BPD, but without any mention of the fact that this study had found 
Borderline to be more prevalent among the male subjects who participated. Ten women 
between the ages of 25 and 49 took part in the Lund study (as well as two male and two female 
therapists). The authors reported that all patients claimed that DBT was ‘lifesaving’. Patients 
adopted the language of DBT when talking about their transformations; for instance, one 
patient held that ‘I can now regulate myself not to go as far as a suicide attempt’. The authors 
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suggested that the strong focus on teaching Borderline patients responsibility for their progress 
in therapy as well as for their lives more generally was an integral part of what made DBT so 
successful. Patients’ statements were quoted as evidence for this. One participant claimed that 
‘It’s been a hell of a struggle all the time, but it’s been worth it’, with another one stating that 
‘I have got a responsibility, it’s me that has to change things with support from my therapist. . 
.’, while a third declared therapy to be ‘a full time job’ (Persius et al., 2003).  
The perception of ‘therapy as work’ offers a striking parallel with ‘work as therapy’, 
which Scull (1989: 90) has referred to as a ‘cornerstone’ of psychological treatment in the 
nineteenth century. In the latter context, productive employment was seen as restorative, a view 
anchored in Protestant ethics. The nineteenth-century language around work and productivity 
saw a revival with the advent of the new liberalism in the late twentieth century. Thus, the 
patients’ language mirrors the wider political discourse in Sweden at the time, where ‘work’ 
and ‘responsibility’ had become keywords in the neoliberal choice revolution.  
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the right-of-centre parties, particularly the 
Moderates, repeatedly portrayed the old Swedish welfare state as stifling of personal growth 
and restrictive of individual freedom, arguing that it encouraged citizens to live off government 
support rather than take responsibility for their own financial situation and find ‘real work’.12 
In a policy statement adopted in 2001 (with the fetching subtitle ‘on the threshold of the best 
era of humanity’), the Moderates held that ‘the new society that is now unfolding improves the 
conditions for more people to become masters of their own fate’. Freedom, however, came 
with greater individual responsibility. ‘The free society’, it continued, ‘also places demands on 
people. It is first and foremost up to each individual to take responsibility for their own life and 
the life choices they make. The consequences of the personal life choice must be borne by each 
and every one’ (Moderata samlingspartiet, 2001: 12). Upon regaining power in the 2006 
general election, the Moderates transformed this sentiment into a welfare reform similar to the 
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British ‘workfare’ system, where financial support was made reliant upon participation in 
various occupational schemes (Liljeberg, Martinsson and Thelander, 2013). 
The idea of DBT as a full time job teaching patients responsibility was reiterated in the 
second article to come out of the Lund study (Persius et al., 2005), where the authors explored 
participating patients’ perceptions of their own suffering before and after DBT. Patients’ 
experiences were organised into three categories: ‘Life on the edge’; ‘A balancing act on a 
slack wire over a volcano’; and ‘The good and the bad act of psychiatric care in the drama of 
suffering’. These categories, which can be read as an attempt to decode as well as homogenise 
patients’ individual experiences, together present a very distinct image of the Borderline patient 
within DBT. She is a relative young woman who is living a difficult life filled with self-
destructive acts (life on the edge), a life characterised by strong and painful emotions which 
are beyond the patient’s control and which can erupt at any moment (the volcano), and a life 
where she has been mostly misunderstood by society and especially psychiatry, treated as 
manipulative when in fact she is helpless and vulnerable (psychiatric care in the drama of 
suffering). Patients are described by the authors as feeling ‘powerless, small, and helpless’. It 
is, however, unclear whether these are words used by the patients to speak of themselves or 
whether it signifies the interpretation of the authors. The patients who are quoted as evidence 
for this view speak of lacking and longing for support in their personal lives, for instance ‘It’s 
hard climbing this narrow path with precipices on either side. I wish there was someone to hold 
my hand supporting me over the obstacles.’ (Persius et al., 2005: 164-5).  Conclusively, DBT 
is framed as teaching the Borderline patient to regulate her painful and strong emotions as well 
as the self-destructive acts. This in turn transforms her from a weak and vulnerable person in 
need of stable and static structures and support, into an autonomous and responsible individual 
able to function in a society that requires independence and flexibility.  
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Between 2002 and 2004, another DBT study was carried out in at the Psychiatry Centre 
at Akademiska Sjukhuset in Uppsala. The study was overseen by Kåver, who cited the 1995 
psychiatry reform as a key factor contributing to the need for a comprehensive DBT programme 
in Sweden, as one consequence of the reform was that ‘difficult’ patients were assigned to 
outpatient clinics badly equipped to deal with them. She noted that in addition to DBT giving 
Borderline patients the chance of a meaningful life, it had also been shown to reduce the 
financial burden of treating this group of patient (Kåver, 2004: 2). The initial findings of the 
Uppsala study were published in 2005 as a dissertation by Erik Hjalmarsson (2005), under the 
supervision of Kåver. Citing Linehan, Hjalmarsson suggested that ‘within DBT it is assumed 
that people who have a strong desire to die do not possess the skills needed to create a life 
worth living’. The Uppsala study also recruited female only subjects, and had as one of its 
explicit aims to evaluate the cost effectiveness of DBT compared to other forms of treatment 
for Borderline patients. Hjalmarsson reported that DBT had resulted in improved psychological 
wellbeing and a reduction in self-destructive acts, remarking that where the latter had 
disappeared entirely, it had ‘probably been replaced by other more functional behaviours’ 
(Hjalmarsson, 2005). He also noted a significant reduction in hospital visits and in overall cost 
of care. In sum, DBT was presented as successful both in terms of alleviating human suffering 
and reducing the financial burden of caring for Borderline patients.   
 
The cultural significance of Borderline and DBT 
How, then, were Borderline patients to be taught the skills to create a life worth living? Kåver 
and Nilsonne explain the method in their 2002 clinical manual on DBT, where they also address 
the question of gender bias in the Borderline diagnosis. They opt to use the ICD-10 label 
Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder (abbreviated in Swedish as IPS) instead of 
Borderline, partly because, they argue, it better reflects the core problematic of this group of 
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patient: an inability to effectively regulate their emotions. They also reject the BPD label due 
to the stigma attached to it, as it is used to describe a patient who is ‘usually female’ and ‘who 
is perceived to be difficult, provocative, and/or manipulative’, and where the prognosis is often 
negative to the point where ‘the patient is considered almost impossible to treat’ (Kåver and 
Nilsonne, 2002: 33). Kåver had previously expressed this sentiment in an article entitled ‘DBT 
for suicidal women’ (Kåver, 1997), suggesting of the BPD patient that her ‘surroundings 
misjudge the patient due to her ostensible and superficial competence. In actual fact, the patient 
has severe difficulties regulating her emotional life and to handle relationships and everyday 
problems in a good way. Linehan adds a feminist perspective to this problematic. Society finds 
it hard to accept dramatic and “wild” girls and the patient’s surroundings react in an 
invalidating way.’ (Kåver, 1997: 133). In their clinical manual, Kåver and Nilsonne follow 
Linehan’s biosocial model for BPD, which holds that an ‘invalidating’ environment (for 
instance, traumatic events such as sexual abuse) triggers a ‘genetic vulnerability’ to produce 
the disorder. However, it is not just the individual’s specific vulnerability and environmental 
triggers that are at play. The authors go on to suggest that ‘a social network appears to be of 
greater importance for women’s wellbeing and psychological health than it does for men.’ This 
view is ‘interesting’, they argue, since ‘we live in a time and culture that values autonomy. One 
is supposed to manage alone and not depend on others’.  However, in many societies and 
cultures this kind of co-dependence is considered perfectly normal and even ‘desirable’, 
whereas in twenty-first century Western culture the Borderline patient ‘is on a course of 
collision with society’s values’ (Kåver and Nilsonne, 2002: 61-2).  
In this way, DBT facilitates a transformation of the Borderline persona from a 
‘manipulative’ woman to a ‘helpless’ one, that is, from a person ‘acting out’ with agency and 
autonomy, to one who is reacting to strong emotions over which she has no control. This 
transformation is particularly striking in light of Kåver and Nilsonne’s nod to ‘feminist 
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psychotherapy’ in their book, suggesting that this offers a way of framing the emotional distress 
of Borderline patients as an ‘appropriate’ response to oppression rather than as ‘an expression 
of personal pathology’ (Kåver and Nilsonne, 2002: 31). While Kåver and Nilsonne 
acknowledge the potential role of patriarchal ‘power structures’ and ‘social values’ in 
producing the Borderline pathology, they fail to address the question of language as productive 
– of gendered features and of psychiatric symptoms, but also of the lived experience of both of 
these. Following Scott (1991), we might suggest that DBT and its language around female 
suffering offered new ways for Borderline patients to experience themselves as Borderline 
patients, new ways to make sense of their distress and how to address it. Through qualitative 
studies of that experience, patients’ perceptions were fed back into the diagnosis (see Hacking, 
1995 on ‘looping effects’), further cementing the Borderline persona as a ‘weak’ woman, but 
one who could learn – through hard work – how to function as an autonomous and stable 
individual in a society that demanded that she did so. What is important to note in regard to the 
present story is that the ‘helpless’ woman better fit her contemporary wider socio-political 
narrative. That is, the infantile and dependent woman constituted by DBT was better suited to 
being transformed by the neoliberal ‘choice revolution’ into a responsible and independent 
adult than her wild and (by society) uncontrollable sister who was very much in charge of her 
own actions. 
In their manual, Kåver and Nilsonne go on to outline various strategies that a DBT 
practitioner can use in conversation with their patients in order to facilitate this transformation. 
They suggest, following Linehan, that the aim of these strategies is in part to reduce the power 
imbalance between patient and therapist, creating a more equal and respectful relationship. 
Therapists are encouraged to use a mix of positive and negative approaches; specifically, they 
are advised to switch between ‘validation’ and ‘warmth’ on the one hand, and ‘irreverence’ on 
the other. This is presented as a particularly effective strategy when dealing with patients 
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engaging in self-harm or in ‘therapy disrupting behaviour’. In one example offered by the 
authors, a patient admits in session to having cut herself with a razor blade. The appropriate 
therapist response is given as validating the feeling that led to the cutting: ‘You must have been 
feeling terrible’ while not accepting cutting as an acceptable coping strategy: ‘you can’t carry 
on with this behaviour! Did you not use any of the skills you’ve learnt?’. When the patient 
explains what led to the cutting, in this case the therapist failing to answer her phone when the 
patient rang, the authors advise that an ‘irreverent’ response is appropriate: ‘well the world is 
full of careless people, you can’t go around killing yourself over that!’  
Nilsonne and Kåver emphasise that while DBT uses both positive and negative 
validation, it never relies on punishment. At the same time, however, the strategies presented 
in their manual amount to a carrot and stick approach, where patients are rewarded when 
behaving appropriately and reprimanded when engaging in inappropriate behaviour, such as 
self-cutting. This is illustrated by another example, where the patient (‘Sofia’) has self-harmed 
in response to a difficult situation and failed to contact the therapist when she was experiencing 
severe distress (this constitutes therapy-disruptive behaviour). Kåver and Nilsonne present the 
following dialogue between therapist and patient: 
 
Therapist: So, we have the self-cutting on Friday and then the therapy-
disruptive behaviour, and then I want to see how you did with your 
home assignment and skills training. I think that’s all we’ll have time 
for today. Does that sound ok?  
 
Sofia: Mum has started calling again, I’d really like to talk about that. 
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Therapist: We’ll see how efficient we can be dealing with the things on 
the agenda, if we’ll have time to talk about mum as well. Presumably 
it would have been more fun to talk about mum than about what 
happened on Friday, but as long as you keep cutting yourself then 
unfortunately a lot of time will be devoted to that. 
 
In this way, the Borderline patient is taught to respond appropriately and responsibly to difficult 
life events, as inappropriate reactions will have negative consequences in terms of the patient’s 
therapeutic experience. Moreover, the terms of the contract ensure that if the patient wants to 
continue to receive help (therapy) she must adhere to the contract and conduct herself in a 
manner that is considered responsible in the context of DBT.  
The process described above is reminiscent of a parent raising an obstinate child. This 
type of therapeutic relationship has a history as long as psychiatry itself: it can be traced back 
to the ‘moral treatment’ of the early nineteenth century, where the fatherly alienist used a 
mixture of kindness and discipline to coax the ‘lunatic’ back to the world of responsible and 
rational human beings. Moral treatment also saw patients engaging in various forms of physical 
and mental activities (such as manual work, sewing, painting, singing, and going to church) 
designed to occupy their minds (and, in some instances, provide free labour). Barbara Taylor 
(2011) draws a parallel between moral treatment and the new psychological treatments of the 
post-war period in her autobiographical narrative of decarceration in Britain, suggesting that 
the latter was a kind of resurrection of the former. However, these two movements were 
anchored in fundamentally different worldviews and approaches to the human condition. The 
psychological treatments of the mid-twentieth-century were, like the dominant political 
projects of the time, profoundly social and relational – this was the era of couples’ and group 
therapies, as well as the period when psychoanalysis reached its popular peak in both Britain 
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and the US. In her discussion of moral treatment Taylor is, while critical, also largely forgiving 
of the intentions and wider social consequences of what has famously been described as a 
different, subtler yet sinister, form of control. However, while Foucault’s (2006[1961]) 
rendition of modern psychiatry was at times sensationalist and often generalising, it was so for 
a reason: his critique was ultimately a political polemic, and as such a tremendously important 
one. He saw the old shackles and chains replaced by something much more effective: an 
internalised desire – or compulsion even – to control oneself. Importantly, his critique was not 
just of psychiatry, but of modernity itself, that is, it was a critique of the Enlightenment project 
and its fruitful marriage to industrialisation and capitalism. Moral treatment, which sought to 
transform the lunatic into a rational, responsible, self-disciplining individual, was a 
fundamentally modern endeavour: a fusion of eighteenth-century moral philosophy and 
nineteenth-century liberal-capitalist (and, to an extent Protestant) values of ‘respectability’ and 
‘self-help’. The focus was on the individual’s ability to function properly in society by way of 
becoming a rational person and internalising these values. In this way, asylum patients were 
assigned occupational tasks not just as a means to preoccupy their minds or provide free labour, 
but also to turn them into ‘useful members of society’ (Chaney, 2016: 277).  
Thus, in the same way as the twenty-first-century neoliberal ethos draws upon a 
Victorian values system, moral treatment has far more in common with the behavioural 
therapies of the late twentieth century, particularly DBT, than it does with the early post-war 
talking therapies, which can on the contrary be seen as part of the post-war social democratic 
project in Western Europe. Moreover, the occupational aspect of moral treatment can be 
compared to the twenty-first-century ‘workfare’ concept referred to above, a programme that 
encourages ‘labour on the self in order to achieve characteristics said to increase employability’ 
(Friedli and Stearn, 2015: 40). This is mirrored in DBT’s focus on ‘hard work’ in order to learn 
the skills necessary to improve one’s own quality of life. DBT, then, draws upon language and 
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values central to turn-of-the-millennium Western society: freedom, choice, independence, and 
responsibility for one’s own life situation. At the same time, this relationship between DBT 
and its cultural context is a circular one, in that the former helps reinforce these values by 
teaching patients to internalise them. This process moreover applies to late-modern psychiatric 
conceptions of ‘self-harm’ more generally, whereby ‘neo-liberalism’s stress on individual 
actors’ radical freedom to make choices for their own benefit fits well with a model of self-
harm that emphasises the individualistic, private feelings of tension, and the self-regulation of 
these through cutting’ (Millard, 2015: 205).13  
 
Conclusion 
Psychiatric diagnoses are malleable, reflecting the cultural contexts in which they operate (see 
e.g. Young, 1995; Hacking 1995; Jansson, 2013b). The transformation of the Borderline 
persona within DBT occurred with ease, much in the same way as the shift from the Social 
Democratic welfare state to the new liberal society. The choice revolution was less a radical 
rupture than a seamless transition, which is not surprising when we consider that both of these 
socio-economic models are borne of the same modernity project. Writing shortly before DBT 
came to Sweden, Nikolas Rose (1993) suggested that the twentieth-century welfare state and 
the market-oriented new liberalism are products of, and belong to, the same conceptual system 
of thought. Taking liberalism as a system of rule rather than a philosophical exercise, Rose 
argued that what he calls ‘advanced liberalism’ has produced a society where the state (and its 
institutions) and the civil and/or social spheres act in symbiosis rather than opposition, where 
people are governed by laws as well as by internalised norms embodied in the institutions and 
spaces that are run by ‘experts’ (e.g. psychiatrists) and which are not ‘public’ or governmental 
in the traditional sense. Within this system 
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relations are established between various centres of calculation and 
diverse projects of rule – more or less 'rationalized' as the case may be 
– such that events within the micro-spaces of bedroom, factory floor, 
schoolroom, medical consulting room might be aligned with aims, 
goals, objectives and principles established in political discourse or 
political programmes. (Rose, 1993: 287) 
 
This perspective can help us understand the work done by and through DBT in post-welfare 
state Sweden where the political language remained benevolent – framing the neoliberal social 
programme as enabling and empowering rather than punitive. In this context, ‘there is no 
simple distinction between those who have power and those who are subject to it’ (Rose, 1993: 
287). Indeed, the relationship between the therapist and the patient was in many ways a 
partnership where significant demands were placed not only on the latter, but also on the former 
– DBT as a ‘full time job’ required commitment and responsibility from both. Moreover, 
patients quoted in the SKIP study internalised the language of the new liberalism, embracing 
the strategies of DBT as helpful in teaching them autonomy, responsibility and self-help. 
Rose’s model can help us think through some of the complexities of how DBT (and other 
cognitive therapies) have come to function in relation to the contemporary neoliberal project, 
where the old psychiatric paternalism is fused with the new discourse of independence and 
choice in a dialectic different from the one intended by DBT, but no less powerful. The reason 
DBT came to work so well in this context (work = fulfil the aims it set itself) is precisely 
because its modus operandi relies upon the specific relationship between knowledge, 
institutions, and the human subject that characterises Rose’s advanced liberalism, a relationship 
where ‘the injunction of the experts merge with our own projects for self-mastery and the 
enhancement of our lives’ (ibid.: 298). 
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To conclude, then: as we have seen, DBT was introduced as a positive approach to a 
stigmatised and cost-heavy psychiatric condition, much like the choice revolution was 
introduced as a positive alternative to the stifling welfare state. Both emphasised choice and 
independence as desirable; as a marker of an individual’s wellbeing as well as their ability to 
function effectively in society. However, in a post-Enlightenment world of dichotomies, the 
flipside of emphasising choice and independence as desirable is what inevitably becomes 
undesirable as a result; in this case, an individual’s need for reliable, permanent structures and 
social support. Taylor’s (2011) astute assessment of mental health care in neoliberal, post-
institutional Britain is an apt description of what is at stake for those who do not possess the 
‘correct’ (i.e. normative) kind of independence and self-sufficiency, and is fitting also for the 
Swedish context: 
 
Today the discourse of mental health ‘providers’ is all about autonomy 
and independence. The language of dependency is almost entirely 
negative. Its primary referents are to drug and alcohol addiction, but 
the pejorative connotations extend across most varieties of neediness, 
including for basic care and support. To need other people on a day-
today basis (unless you are very young, very old or very disabled) is 
seen as inherently pathological; independence is a sina qua non of 
mental health. (Taylor, 2011: 198) 
 
We can recall, here, that where the patients quoted in the SKIP study expressed a need or wish 
for ‘support’ from other human beings, the clinicians interpreting their responses translated 
these as patients ‘feeling powerless, small, and helpless.’ The meaning might, on the surface, 
appear the same, but the language is significantly different. In the most basic sense, this is a 
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difference between viewing a person’s suffering as a social or as an individual problem. 
Moreover, while DBT sought to re-write the misogynistic narrative of the Borderline patient 
and reject the prevalent image of the manipulative woman as the stereotypical BPD sufferer, 
this reconfiguration of the Borderline persona served an important function in relation to the 
new liberal ethos. Within the context of DBT, the BPD patient was constituted as a ‘weak’ and 
‘helpless’ woman unable to cope in a post-institutional society that favoured independence, 
freedom and choice. In other words, the typical Borderline patient was framed as the ultimate 
anomaly of the new liberalism: someone who needed stability, permanence, and social support, 
and who reacted irrationally and impulsively to her surroundings. The role of DBT, then, was 
to teach the ‘helpless’ Borderline woman the skills required to ‘help herself’ in a society where 
a person’s need for social support was increasingly construed as contrary to both good character 
and good health.  
 
Notes 
1. See the National Health Service and Community Care Act (1990), which created an 
internal market for health care ‘providers’ within the NHS.  
2. This was the term used by newly elected Prime Minister Carl Bildt in 1991, when he 
introduced the programme of the new coalition government to the Parliament. ‘Choice 
revolution’ (valfrihetsrevolution) became a defining policy catchword for the right-of-
centre government over the next few years. ‘Regeringsförklaring. Anf. Statsminster 
Carld Bildt’, Riksdagens snabbprotokoll (Parlimanentary protocol) 1991/92:6, October 
4, 1991. 
3. See Ernst (2016); Wiener (1990: see esp. pp. 117-22); Driver (1993). 
4. Health care in Sweden has been the responsibility of county councils since the 1960s 
(Brinck, 1994: 259), whereas other social services (elderly care, childcare, family 
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support, and youth services) are the responsibility of local municipalities. One of the 
consequences of the 1995 reform was to transfer much of the responsibility for caring 
for psychiatric patients from the councils to the municipalities, that is, from medical 
professionals to social workers. Socialtjänstlagen (the Social Service Act), ch. 21-23; 
Hälso- och sjukvårdslagen (Law of Health and Medical Care), ch 8. It should also be 
noted that, while the factors behind decarceration in Britain might have been more 
diverse, by the turn of the millennium ‘choice’ had become a virtually ubiquitous 
catchword in health care systems across the West, including the NHS. See for example 
Department of Health. Building on the Best: Choice, Responsiveness and Equity in the 
NHS. London, 2003, P. 3.  
5. Provisions of the reform were contained in the act Psykiskt stördas villkor (The 
conditions of severely mentally ill persons).  
6. For a poignant discussion of how cultural ideas about stereotypically ‘male’ and 
‘female’ personality traits operate in the DSM personality disorder diagnoses, see 
Nuckolls (2013a, 2013b). 
7. It should also be noted that the DSM-III task force, headed by Robert Spitzer, formally 
removed any psychotic features from the Borderline diagnosis, effectively dividing the 
earlier – and somewhat broad and eclectic – Borderline concept into two distinct 
diagnostic categories: BPD and Schizoid Personality Disorder. In this way, a much-
debated and contested psychiatric category was delineated and standardised as a 
personality disorder defined according to behaviour and affect (rather than cognitive 
reasoning or illusionary experiences). Spitzer outlined the rational for this decision 
shortly before the publication of DSM-III (Spitzer and Endicott, 1979). 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8. The meaning of ‘suicidal’ is, however, ambiguous in psychiatry, and has been since the 
mid-nineteenth century, when it became part of standard diagnostic language. See 
Jansson (2013a). 
9. As historians of suicide will be aware, the idea that women ‘attempt’ and men ‘commit’ 
has been popular among physicians at least since the late nineteenth century, and has 
been fashioned with a variety of explanations (e.g. Kushner, 1985).  
10. The model of mental disorders as arising from the interaction between an individual (or 
organism) and its environment has its roots in nineteenth-century psychology and 
psychological medicine. See Jansson (2013b: Ch. 3) 
11. The concept of the individual is itself historically complex. As Foucault suggests, the 
abstract but pervasive idea of the autonomous individual promoted by the 
Enlightenment project and liberal-capitalist culture obscures ‘the individual as an 
historical reality’ produced by modern ‘disciplinary technology’, including psychiatry 
(Foucault, 2006: 57). 
12. ‘Real work’ or ‘real jobs’ were frequently contrasted with Social-Democratic initiatives 
offered to people on unemployment support, such as government apprenticeships or 
community college courses. See e.g. Moderata samlingspartiet, election manifestos 
1998 and 2002.  
13. This can be compared with the internalisation of ‘anxiety’ and ‘depression’ as 
biological pathologies with chemical solutions, which, following Moncrieff, is another 
way in which the neoliberal ethos informs twenty-first century attitudes to health and 
illness (Moncrieff, 2006).  
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